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DR 5-105(D) of the Code
Of Professional Responsibility
I. INTRODUCTION
A controversy is brewing between the American Bar Association
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the Legal
Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Association over
the proper interpretation to be given to the new version of DR 5-
105 (D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.' This provision
was amended in February, 1974, to widen the coverage of the rule
on vicarious disqualification. Before amendment, the rule dis-
qualified all affiliates of a lawyer who was required to decline or
withdraw from employment because of the restrictions of DR 5-
105. The new version calls for the disqualification of affiliates
when any Disciplinary Rule prevents a lawyer from accepting a
case.
The broad language of the amendment has potential application
to lawyers all over the country, but probably will have its greatest
impact in the District of Columbia. The typical career pattern for
a Washington lawyer is to enter a government agency or depart-
ment as a young law school graduate, then join a firm specializing
in government dealings, then move back into the government as,
perhaps, an agency general counsel, and finally rejoin the firm as
a senior partner.2 This "Washington revolving door for lawyers'
3
could be shut by DR 5-105 (D) if the new language is interpreted
literally. It could discourage lawyers from entering government
1. "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or con-
tinue such employment." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
CANONS, No. 5, DR 5-105(D) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as DR
5-105 (D) ].
2. Moskowitz, "Can D.C. Lawyers Cut the Ties that Bind?," JuRIs DocToR,
Sept. 1976, at 34.
3. Id.
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service and make firms extremely wary of hiring ex-government
lawyers.
The controversy over the new rule arose because the two bar
associations most interested in the rule developed opposing inter-
pretations of it. The American Bar Association, apparently per-
suaded by arguments that the rule could greatly hinder career mo-
bility, hedged on the clear language of the rule.4 It decided that
certain policy considerations outweigh a strict disqualification rule
and that, therefore, it will allow the rest of the firm members to
handle a case if the disqualified partner is adequately "screened"
from the others. The D.C. Bar Association, in contrast, stuck to
a literal construction of the new rule and would disqualify the
whole firm without exception.5
This article will provide a brief background on the disqualifi-
cation issues involved in DR 5-105 (D), examine the two different
opinions, and then offer some comments on the debate over the
proper interpretation of the new rule.
IL THE DISQUALIFICATON RULES
The amendment to DR 5-105(D) involves two disqualification
issues: first, the vicarious disqualification of an entire firm when
one of its members is prevented by ethical considerations from
handling a case; and second, the disqualification of former govern-
ment lawyers from becoming involved in matters with which they
dealt while in government service. These two closely related issues
sprang from the same three basic policy considerations.6 The first
is the protection of a client's confidential communications. 7 Unless
a client can be sure that the information he gives to his attorney
will not be used against him without his permission, he will not
speak freely and honestly. Open disclosure is essential to enable
a lawyer to prepare a case adequately. The second policy is that an
attorney should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.8 Even
though there may not be an actual conflict of interest, it is not
desirable for the public to see a lawyer appear both for and against
4. ABA COMM. ON POFESSIONAL ETHicS, OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975).
5. D.C. BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETmcs, OPINIONS, Inquiry No. 19 (Tent.
Draft, May 18, 1976).
6. See Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, 70 HARv. L. Rsv. 657, 659-60 (1957).
7. This policy was recognized by the common law. See Note, Disqual-
ification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former
Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 918-19 (1955). See also ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIIII, CANONS, No. 4 (1976).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANONS, No. 9 (1976).
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a client. The client should be able to rely on the fact that his
lawyer will not help the opposition later, whether or not confiden-
tial information was exchanged. A third policy, the avoidance of
conflicts of interest, 9 works to prevent violations of the first two
policies. It reflects the belief that a man cannot serve two
masters. 10 Only by completely disregarding the interests of every
other person, including himself, can an attorney give his client the
best possible representation and counseling.
The rule that the disqualification of one lawyer disqualifies all
affiliated lawyers is based upon the "close, informal relationship
among law partners and associates and upon the incentives, finan-
cial and otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely
among themselves when the information relates to existing employ-
ment."" It recognizes the fact that lawyers in a firm will discuss
a case among themselves and that if a client's confidences are to
be protected, it must be assumed that what one firm member
knows, all the members know.1 2
Under the Canons of Professional Ethics, the vicarious disquali-
fication rule was based on canons six1 " and 37,14 which dealt with
conflicts of interests and client confidences, respectively. Canon
four, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of
a Client," and canon five, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
9. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANONS, No. 5 (1976).
10. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 2 (1975).
11. Id. at 1 n.2.
12. Kaufman, supra note 6, at 662.
13. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, ex-
cept by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon,
a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fi-
delity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids
also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 6.
14. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confi-
dences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and ex-
tends as well to his employees; and neither of them should
accept employment which involves or may involve the dis-
closure or use of these confidences, either for the private ad-
vantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage
of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even
though there are other available sources of such information.
A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers
that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty
to his former or to his new client ....
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 37.
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Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client," are the pertinent
sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 15
Under the vicarious disqualification rule, the receipt of confiden-
tial information from a disqualified partner is inferred.1 6 This re-
lieves the client of the extremely difficult burden of proving that
his confidences actually were exchanged within the firm"7 and pre-
serves the secrecy of the information.18 However, the presumption
is not an irrebuttable one. In one leading case, Laskey Brothers
v. Warner Brothers Pictures,'9 the Second Circuit held that after
dissolution of a partnership, the partner to whom knowledge was
imputed could rebut the inference of receipt of information in a
case having no relation to the former partnership.2 0  Malkan, a
15. Canons 6 and 37 of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmECS (and,
presumably, canons 4 and 5 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY) are complementary. Canon 6 forbids accepting a case
the subject of which is substantially related to and in conflict with
a former case. Canon 37, on the other hand, prevents accepting a
case regardless of its subject matter and the subject matter of a prior
case, if it might involve disclosure of a former client's confidences.
Kaplan, Forbidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U. L. Ruv. 914, 915-16 (1956).
However, both rules serve to protect the client from his lawyer and
to impress upon the attorney the great responsibility he undertakes
when he represents that client.
16. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th
Cir. 1971); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1955); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Man-
agement Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); Silver Chrysler Plymouth
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
aff'd, 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Standard Oil Co.
136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 342
(1975): "Imputation of knowledge from a lawyer to his firm need
not be explored where a lawyer is disqualified by reason of prior
representation or employment, for DR 5-105(D) specifically makes
all associated lawyers disqualified and therefore knowledge vel non
is irrelevant." Id. at 8 n.25.
17. Because the exchange is likely to take place orally, it would be nearly
impossible for an aggrieved client to present convincing evidence of
the breach of confidence. See Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing
Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest,
73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1060-61 (1964).
18. It would be self-defeating to require the client to introduce the con-
fidential information into evidence. Such disclosure would "tear
aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer-client relationship"
and destroy any incentive to reveal confidential information. T.C. &
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953).
19. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955).
20. Apparently the inference is irrebuttable as long as the partnership
is in effect. See 68 HAwv. L. REv. 1084 (1955); Note, supra note 7.
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member of the firm representing the plaintiff, had previously been
associated with Isacson, who had at an earlier time represented the
defendant. In Laskey, which was unrelated to any matter handled
by the partnership of Malkan and Isacson, Malkan was allowed to
counter the presumption that he had obtained privileged informa-
tion about the defendant.
The court reasoned that if the presumption were irrebuttable,
young lawyers could jeopardize their careers by affiliating with
large law firms. They would be unattractive to other employers
because their mere presence in a firm could require the disqualifi-
cation of that firm from a substantial amount of business. The
problem was especially acute in highly specialized areas of the law,
as was the case in Laskey. Not only would firms be cutting off
their source of business by hiring lawyers with confidential informa-
tion; it would also be much more difficult for clients to find com-
petent attorneys in the field who weren't disqualified.
A later case, Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors
Corp.,21 dealt with a slightly different fact situation from that in
Laskey, but came to the same result by using similar reasoning.
Schreiber, a member of the firm representing the plaintiff, had once
been associated with the firm of Kelley Drye, which represented
the defendant in the instant case and at the time Schreiber had
been affiliated with the firm. In deciding whether or not to dis-
qualify Schreiber, the court took a balancing approach, weighing
the need to preserve client confidences against the possible effects
on an attorney's career and the right to obtain counsel. It con-
cluded that the presumption could be rebutted because Schrieber
had not himself represented the defendant in a substantially related
case. Another important factor which the court seemed to rely on
was Kelley Drye's size 22 and high turnover rate. The court as-
sumed that a junior associate, especially one in such a large law
office, would not know as much about a case as a senior partner
would. It was therefore not logical to presume that the associate
had received confidential information from another firm member.
The court was also fearful of making young lawyers overcommitted
to their initial employers by placing potential limits on their later
practices. It construed the vicarious disqualification rule as a res-
triction on the right to compete against a former employer, which
could restrict free trade.
21. 370 F. Supp. 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afi'd, 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. The Kelley Drye Firm had approximately 80 members.
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The other issue relevant to the new version of DR 5-105 (D) is
the disqualification of former government employees. This res-
traint is merely a specialized application of the rule disqualifying
any attorney in order to protect client confidences and prevent a
conflict of interest.23
The ethical problems caused when a former government lawyer
enters private practice have been approached in several different
ways. Under the Canons of Professional Ethics, canon 3624 made
it unethical for a former government lawyer to handle a matter
he had "investigated or passed upon" while he was employed by
the government. The "passed upon" test, however, was too broad
to be applied satisfactorily. For instance, a lawyer could be dis-
qualified because of a "rubber stamp" approval of work done by
another.25 It was also necessary to disregard the language of canon
36 in order to avoid holding that a lawyer who was a former
governor was barred from litigation involving any laws he had
passed upon while he was governor.26
The present section on disqualification of former government
employees, DR 9-101 (B),27 is under canon nine, "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." The im-
23. The disqualification rules of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
siBIITy are not the only restrictions on former government attorneys;
18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970), bars an individual from ever representing an
interest adverse to the government on matters in which he was sub-
stantially and personally involved while employed by the govern-
ment. It also forbids him, for one year, from personally appearing
before any court or government department or agency in regard to
any matter that was under his official responsibility as a govern-
ment official. The statute deals only with individual disqualification.
Apparently Congress meant to leave the problem of firm disqual-
ification to the legal profession itself. See Note, supra note 17, at
1064-66.
24. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs No. 36, provides that: "A
lawyer having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in con-
nection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ."
25. ABA COMM. ON PROFESsIONAL ETmIcs, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 7 (1975).
The Opinion cites ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 37 (1931), in which it was held that a lawyer could not accept
employment relating to a land title simply because title reports had
been made in his name as assistant chief title examiner. This formal-
ity was enough to satisfy the "passed upon" test.
26. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONs, No. 342, at 7 (1975)
(citing ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 26 (1930)).
27. "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
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portant test now is whether the former official had "substantial
responsibility" in the matter while he was a public employee. This
language looks for more than just a mechanical approval or disap-
proval of the matter;28 there must be "a responsibility requiring
the official to become personally involved to an important, material
degree, in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the
transactions or facts in question. '29 It is not necessary that the
official substantially and personally handle the matter, but it is
enough if "he had such a heavy responsibility for the matter in
question that it is unlikely he did not become personally and sub-
stantially involved in the investigative or deliberative processes re-
garding that matter."30 If he did become so closely involved while
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANONS, No. 9, DR 9-101
(B) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as DR 9-101(B)].
28. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 9 (1975)
(citing ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1129
(1969)).
If a former government attorney were charged with knowledge of
every document that passed through his department, his career would
be unnecessarily restricted. Instead, a doctrine of vertical respon-
sibility has been used to determine whether the attorney had sub-
stantial responsibility for a matter. Under this theory, only knowl-
edge of information obtained by subordinates in the attorney's office
or subdivision is imputed to him. See United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Kaufman, supra note 6,
at 665-67.
29. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 9 (1975).
This accords with the view expressed by Judge Irving Kaufman:
A former government attorney cannot be held to the same
rules of imputed knowledge and inferences of receipt of con-
fidences arising from access to related data which bind attor-
neys in private practice, who have easily definable clients
and law firms. In place of those automatically disqualifying
inferences, a test which requires a factual showing of actual
knowledge or strong likelihood of receipt of knowledge should
be substituted, except in the situations where the attorney
had a duty to perform a specific task and did not perform it
and where the supervisor had ultimate responsibility for all
the work of his office, despite the fact that he was not in-
formed about some of it. If there is a close question as to
whether particular confidences of the former client will be
pertinent to the pending controversy an attorney should be
disqualified in order to avoid the appearance if not the ac-
tuality of evil. But where an attorney has worked for a
vast government agency it is unreasonable to hold that an
appearance of evil can be found in his undertaking a case
against the Government if there is not some closer factual
relationship between his former job and the pending litiga-
tion than that the same vast agency is involved.
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 667.
30. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 9 (1975).
DISQUALIFICATION DILEMMA
a public employee, his representation of a client in the same matter
as a private attorney would be regarded as "switching sides," could
endanger confidential government information, and would appear
improper in that it creates suspicion that the lawyer used his gov-
ernment employment in order to create future legal work for
himself.3 '
III. THE ABA OPINION
When the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility first was called upon to interpret the new version of DR
5-105 (D),32 its tentative decision was that a firm would be disqual-
ified if one partner, a former government employee, were prohibited
from handling a case.3 3 This initial opinion merely followed the
language of the new rule. However, it also alerted some Washing-
ton lawyers to the possible effects the new rule could have on pri-
vate firms that hired former government lawyers. This effect ap-
peared to require a choice between not hiring the lawyer and
dropping a client who might pose a disqualification problem. The
government was sympathetic. It feared that a literal interpretation
of the rule would cause government lawyers to leave the civil ser-
vice earlier than usual so that they could avoid becoming involved
in matters that might later lead to disqualification. The ABA com-
mittee apparently was persuaded by these arguments when it wrote
its final opinion in November 1975.
The committee found four policy reasons behind DR 9-101(B):
the duplicity of switching sides;3 4 the protection of confidential
government information from use against the government; 35 the
prevention of government lawyers working on matters so as to
create employment for themselves after leaving government ser-
vice; and the desirability of avoiding the appearance of evil.36
In General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1974), it was held that an attorney who had not had actual super-
visory responsibility over a case but had played an important part
in preparing the case did have substantial responsibility.
31. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 9 (1975).
32. The case involved a former Navy lawyer who had become a govern-
ment contracting specialist with a Washington firm. JuRIs DOCTOR,
Sept. 1976, at 35-36.
33. Id. at 36-37.
34. The committee found that "canon 5 and DR 9-101(B) are based at
least in part on the same considerations of ethics." ABA Comm. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 342, at 3 n.10 (1975).
35. This indicates a link between DR 9-101(B) and canon 4 of the ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBITy. Id. at 4 n.11.
36. Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
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However, the committee also found "weighty policy considera-
tions" favoring an interpretation of the rule that would not restrict
a former government lawyer's private practice: the inability of the
government to attract competent people if future employment is
restricted and the great sacrifice of lawyers who would enter
government service; the possibility that the rule could become a
"mere tool" for litigants to use to deprive opponents of capable at-
torneys; and the denial of the right to competent counsel, parti-
cularly in specialized areas.
37
The committee found that although none of these policy consi-
derations was a part of DR 9-101(B), the rule should be construed
to conform with them. The most difficult facet of the rule to inter-
pret was the idea of "substantial responsibility." After examining
the language of former canon 36, the committee looked at the new
approach of DR 9-101 (B). It concluded that a former government
lawyer must be disqualified if he had so much responsibility in
a matter that he became involved in the investigative or decision-
making process. But it immediately set out this caveat: "The ele-
ment of 'substantial responsibility' as so construed should not
unduly hinder the government in recruiting lawyers to its ranks
nor interfere needlessly with the right of litigants to employ tech-
nically skilled and trained former government lawyers to represent
them."3 8
According to the ABA committee, DR 5-105 (D) was amended
to include the disqualification of all affiliated lawyers so that
lawyers could not circumvent the Disciplinary Rules. In the case
of former government lawyers, however, "inflexible application of
DR 5-105 (D) would actually thwart the policy considerations un-
derlying DR 9-101 (B) .39 The automatic disqualification of a whole
firm would tend to impede government recruitment and make it
more difficult to obtain competent representation. 40 To prevent
such undesirable side effects, the ABA committee ruled that DR
9-101 (B) 's application does not necessarily bring DR 5-105 (D) into
operation. Instead, the vicarious disqualification rules should be
construed in a way that would effectuate all the factors behind DR
9-101(B).
37. Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Judge Kaufman has argued that if the government is unable to
attract competent attorneys because of narrow interpretations of ethi-
cal rules, it will be an unfavorable reflection on the legal profession
and its "public-service traditions." Kaufman, supra note 6, at 668.
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The committee felt that ethical standards would be fully complied
with if the individual lawyer were disqualified and screened from
participating in the case either directly or indirectly. The appli-
cation of DR 5-105 (D) was limited to the firm, partners, and asso-
ciates of a disqualified lawyer who, in the opinion of the govern-
ment agency involved, has not been screened from participation in
and compensation for any work on a matter over which he had
substantial responsibility while employed by the government. 41 It
was the committee's opinion that
whenever the government agency is satisfied that the screening
measures will effectively isolate the individual lawyer from par-
ticipating in the particular matter and sharing in the fees attribut-
able to it, and that there is no appearance of significant impropri-
ety affecting the interests of the government, the government may
waive the disqualification of the firm under DR 5-105 (D) .42
If there is a waiver, and the firm itself also determines that there
will be no significant appearance of impropriety, the firm may ac-
cept or retain the case.43
IV. THE D.C. BAR OPINION
Not long after the ABA's stand on the new rule was made
known, the D.C. Bar Committee on Legal Ethics came to the oppo-
site conclusion. It interpreted DR 5-105(D) to mean that the dis-
qualification of one member does disqualify the whole firm.4 4  It
took a different approach to the problems and policies involved in
the disqualification question.
The D.C. committee agreed with the ABA committee that the
policy reasons behind DR 9-101(B) were helpful in construing the
rule, but complained that those reasons were too vague and
unspecific to be of much use. It criticized the ABA opinion for
failing to explain the policy considerations it thought were impor-
41. ABA COMM. oN PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONs, No. 342, at 11 (1975).
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.
44. As of December 8, 1976, D.C. BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS,
Inquiry No. 19 (Tent. Draft, May 18, 1976), had not been adopted be-
cause a majority of the full membership of the Committee had not
voted in favor of the opinion (the vote was 9 to 7 in favor, with 3
abstentions; 10 votes were required to adopt the opinion). However,
the Committee is 11 to 5 in support of a Code amendment that would
impute disqualification to other firm members and provide no screen-
ing exception. Therefore, although the draft opinion has not been
formally adopted, it is clear that a substantial majority of the Commit-
tee is in support of the policies set out in the opinion. Letter from
Monroe H. Freedman to the author (Dec. 8, 1976).
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tant (appearance of evil, switching sides, guarding confidential
government information, and discouraging government lawyers
from self-dealing) or to show what relation they had to a correct
solution.
45
According to the D.C. committee, the basic error in the ABA
opinion was that it glossed over the problem of the appearance of
professional impropriety. 46 While the ABA opinion treated that as
merely one of the factors behind DR 9-101(B), the D.C. committee
felt that since avoiding the appearance of professional impropriety
had been given the status of an "axiomatic norm" as one of the
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, it should be ac-
corded much more weight than it had been given by the ABA com-
mittee.47 It was also important to remember that whether or not
a lawyer's conduct may be improper is to be judged through the
eyes of an unsophisticated public that might not recognize subtle
distinctions that are clear to a lawyer's eye.48  At the same time,
though, there must be "some rational basis for objection to parti-
cular conduct[;] the mere fact that the conduct might be mis-
interpreted through malice or ignorance should not in itself be
grounds for a determination of professional impropriety. '49
The opinion then dealt with the various ethical concerns that
arise in connection with situations that may present an appearance
45. D.C. BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETHics, OPINIONS, Inquiry No. 19, at 7-8
(Tent. Draft, May 18, 1976).
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 8-9. The Second Circuit expressed a similar view in Emle
Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 470 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973):
Nothing in the Code of Professional Responsibility or in
the teaching of prior cases warrants . . . ethical relativity,
for the Code . . . "set[s] up a high moral standard, akin to
that applicable to a fiduciary .... Without firm judicial
support, the Canons of Ethics would be only reverberating
generalities." Empire Linotype School v. United States, 143
F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). We have said that our duty
in this case is owed not only to the parties . . .but to the
public as well. These interests require this court to exercise
its leadership to insure that nothing, not even the appearance
of impropriety, is permitted to tarnish our judicial process.
The stature of the profession and the courts, and the esteem
in which they are held, are dependent upon the complete
absence of even a semblance of improper conduct.
Id. at 575.
48. D.C. BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETics, OPINIONS, Inquiry No. 19, at 9 (Tent.
Draft, May 18, 1976). It has been held that even proof that no
confidential information was revealed by a former client will not
remove the appearance of a breach of confidence; hence disquali-
fication is still required in such cases. See Hull v. Celanese Corp.,
513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637,
639 (W.D. Wisc. 1974).
49. D.C. BAR COMM. ON LEGAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, Inquiry No. 19, at 9A
(Tent. Draft, May 18, 1976).
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of impropriety, and whether those concerns could be resolved by
disqualifying only one member and not the whole firm. The most
commonly cited policy reason, confidentiality, was not thought to
be significant in itself when a former government lawyer is con-
cerned.50 But unfair advantage may be given to one private party
if he were to obtain inside information from an attorney who had
previously worked for the government. Even if the attorney had
no secrets to divulge, it could appear to the public that he did.51
There is also the potential problem of the appearance of favoritism
when an ex-government lawyer deals with his former colleagues
even though, again, that may not be true.52 It may seem to the
public that a lawyer is uncommitted, opportunistic, and scheming
if he shifts from one side of a matter to the other when he leaves
the government to enter private practice.53 A private firm might
be accused of "buying" government lawyers in order to improve
its position with an agency.5 4 The lawyers themselves may try to
help their own careers by gaining the favor of potential future em-
ployers, by using the government's power to gain information or
other advantages against future defendants in private suits, and by
starting government litigation in order to create future private em-
ployment. 55
Taking into account all these policy considerations, the D.C. com-
mittee concluded that while the problems of "switching sides" and
using government power to further an attorney's career could be
handled by individual disqualification, the whole firm must be dis-
qualified if there is any question of favoritism to former colleagues
or of giving unfair advantages to a client by revealing government
secrets. In those cases, merely barring one attorney would not elim-
inate the appearance of improper conduct. Therefore, if an attor-
ney is disqualified because he had substantial responsibility in a
matter while he was employed by the government, his partners and
associates must also be disqualified. 56
The D.C. committee disapproved of the ABA's creation of the
screening exception as an ineffective and unauthorized solution for
several reasons. Screening cannot prevent favoritism or effectively
regulate lawyers who attempt to give clients an unfair advantage,
nor is it relevant to the problems of "stealing" away key govern-
ment attorneys or the lawyer's ingratiating himself with a future
50. Id. at 10-11.
51. Id. at 11-12.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 16-17.
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employer. 57 The screening procedure also poses a serious conflict
of interest problem in that the government lawyers who judge the
procedure have much to gain from a decision that the firm is not
disqualified. This might preserve employment for themselves
should they later enter private practice. Finally, screening does
not avoid the appearance to the public of conflict of interest, but
aggravates and complicates it. 5s
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the disqualification of lawyers under DR
5-105(D) is by no means over; in fact, there are indications that
it has just begun. 59 But it has not yet advanced beyond the stage
where each side is flinging its own pet policy reasons at the other
without also supporting those policies with facts. Before the dis-
qualification problem can be satisfactorily resolved, those involved
in the debate must assess the validity of the arguments they are
making. There are certain questions that must be answered first.
The foremost fear in the minds of those who oppose a strict in-
terpretation of the disqualification rule is that the "revolving door"
will be shut. But they apparently have failed to ask some basic
questions about the likelihood of such an occurrence. First of all,
does the "revolving door" really exist even now? Everyone seems
simply to have assumed that it does, without trying to verify that
belief. If there is a real "revolving door," it might take more than
a strictly construed Disciplinary Rule to shut it. A private em-
ployer would undoubtedly consider the possibility that an ex-
government lawyer may be disqualified from handling a case and
could thereby "taint" the whole firm. Does that necessarily mean
that the employer would decide against hiring that lawyer, or that
lawyers would avoid entering government service? Those in favor
of an interpretation like the ABA's assume that the door should be
kept open. But would closing it actually be as disastrous as they
57. Id. at 18-19.
58. Id. at 19-20.
59. In December 1976, the ethics committee of the New York City Bar
Association issued an opinion that opposes automatic disqualification
of firms employing former government attorneys as long as the latter
are "effectively isolated." The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has made its conflict of interest rules stricter
and the Securities and Exchange Commission plans to make public
the names of lawyers who are granted or denied waivers. In
addition, President Carter is considering banning short-term job
shifts between government and private employment by his appointees
in order to prevent conflicts of interest. Conflict of interest: the
debate heats up, 63 A.B.A. J. 16 (1977).
DISQUALIFICATION DILEMMA
suppose it would be? Couldn't a strict interpretation of DR-5-105(D)
help to improve the quality of government lawyers by discouraging
self-interested people from seeking employment with the govern-
ment? Is government employment the only way to gain experience
in dealing with the government? Are there not firms specializing
in such matters that would give a lawyer the opportunity to develop
a certain amount of expertise in the area?
The ABA argues that a strict construction of the rule would
drastically reduce the number of lawyers available to clients. How
likely is it that this would happen in fields of law that are not
concentrated in the hands of a few practitioners? Just how great
an effect do the restrictions of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility have on an attorney's willingness to take a case? Does the
chance that he may risk committing an ethical violation really deter
him from representing a client?
Can a member of a law firm effectively be screened from partici-
pating in a case? The ABA seems to assume that he can. 60 But
this view might overlook the realities of the close relationships that
exist betwen law partners. Can every casual comment be moni-
tored? Can a disqualified attorney so isolate himself from the rest
of the firm that there will be no leakage of confidential informa-
tion? In short, is screening a practical solution?
How important is the appearance of impropriety in deciding
what a lawyer may or may not do? The D.C. Bar gives it top prior-
ity while the ABA merely balances it against other factors. Is it
the ultimate restriction on a lawyer's conduct or is it only part of
a sliding scale?
These are by no means all of the questions that must be asked
and answered by everyone espousing a view on the disqualification
issue. Every factor and policy argument should be subjected to
this type of close scrutiny. In the final analysis, the "relevant con-
siderations" are the facts and not necessarily what those with an
authoritative voice in the matter say they are. Only by taking a
close, hard look at those facts can a realistic, workable, and satis-
factory solution to the disqualification dilemma be reached.
Marlene Miller Haskell, '77
60. Although the New York Bar Association's opinion suggested screening
as a solution to the disqualification problem, it conceded that there
may be situations in which "the disqualified lawyer's relationship
with the subject matter while in government was so close, and the
significance of his role was so great, that no degree of screening ...
will suffice to remove the appearance of impropriety." Id.
